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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - FREEDOM OF SPEECH
- LOYALTY OATHS
Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
Although the teaching community may view loyalty oaths as a
most annoying infringement upon its academic freedom, the oaths
are nevertheless required of faculty members in some public schools
and universities.1 Objections to loyalty oaths have been made in
the courts,2 and in 1952 one case reached the Supreme Court of the
United States. Adler v. Board of Eduac.,3 perhaps to the dismay of
civil libertarians, upheld the New York Feinberg Law4 as a valid
exercise of the state's police power over education, but the Court
failed to reach the issue of the statute's vagueness, which was done
twelve years later in Baggett v. Bullitt.6  The holding of Baggett,
that due process requires the exact meaning of what is proscribed
by a statute to be ascertainable on its face,7 is a corollary of the
principle that, in first amendment cases, a statute or regulation can-
IE.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 875.05-.06 (1965); GA. CODE ANN. §5 89-311, -314
(1963); LA. REV. STAT. § 42:52 (1965); PA. STAT. ANN. tic. 65, §§ 214-15 (1959);
TEx. Crv. STAT. ANT. art. 6252-7.1 (1962).
2 E.g., Georgia Conference of the Am. Assoc. of Univ. Professors v. Board of Re-
gents, 246 F. Supp. 553 (N.D. Ga. 1965).
3 342 U.S. 485 (1952).
4 N.Y. EDuc. LAw § 3022. This law implements § 3021 of the Education Law
and § 105 of the Civil Service Law by empowering the Board of Regents, an adminis-
trative body, to devise procedures for enforcement of the statutes' policy. The loyalty
oath, or "Feinberg Certificate" was devised by the Board of Regents in the exercise of
that administrative power.
5Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952). To the contention by the majority
that the entering of public employment constitutes a free choice to waive certain con-
stitutional rights, Mr. Justice Douglas dissented vociferously. Id. at 508. The dis-
sent by Mr. Justice Black expressed dismay at the uncontrolled discretion given the
Board of Regents over first amendment freedoms. Id. at 496. Mr. Justice Frankfur-
ter took a different approach in his dissent, insisting that the question should not have
been decided at all, since taxpayers had no standing under article III to litigate the
question of loyalty oaths for teachers, and that the question was purely abstract, since
no actual grievance was presented to the Court. Id. at 497.
Critics sided with Mr. Justice Frankfurter. Professor Freund lamented: "It is
greatly to be regretted that the Court exhausted its function in deciding these questions
on so abstract a record." Freund, The Supreme Court, 1951 Term, 66 HAtRv. L REV.
89, 96 (1952). A student opined that the Court was in danger of appearing arbi-
trary in the application of the case or controversy doctrine. Note, 66 HAPv. L REv.
99, 121 (1952).
6 377 U.S. 360 (1964). That case held that the words "aiding or abetting" had
too broad a sweep and might be stretched to include a lawful exercise of constitutional
rights. It is not dear, for example, that a lawyer defending a person accused of violat-
ing the Smith Act would not be "aiding or abetting" Communism within the language
of the statute. Id. at 368.
71d. at 371.
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not sweep more broadly than the wrong to be remedied.' Under
the Baggett rationale if vague statutory language can be stretched
to an unconstitutionally broad result, it cannot be enforced.9
In the recent case of Keyishian v. Board of Regents," the ap-
pellants, faculty members at the State University of New York, at-
tacked the constitutionality of the Feinberg Law for a second time.
Under a ruling promulgated by the Board of Regents under that
law, the appellants were required to sign loyalty oaths as a pre-
condition to continued employment." Appellant Keyishian, along
with four other University employees who refused to comply with
the rule, sued for declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that the
ruling was unconstitutional. The district court's dismissal" was
reversed by the Supreme Court.
A majority of five Justices, speaking through Mr. Justice Bren-
nan, noted that while Adler had sustained the law, the problem of
vagueness urged by these appellants had not been reached in that
case."2 Moreover, to the extent that Adler sustained the dismissal
of a faculty member for mere membership in the Communist Party
without a specific intent to further its unlawful aims, it had been
implicitly overruled by a subsequent decision.'4 The Court held
that the regulatory maze created by the statutes and administrative
rulings was lacking in terms susceptible of objective measurement
and was unconstitutionally vague under the doctrine of Baggett 'V.
Bullitt,' In the view of the majority, the vagueness of the Re-
gent's ruling was aggravated by the "prolixity and profusion" of
the statutes and other rulings and by the many cross-references they
contained. 18
8For example, a teacher cannot be forced, as a condition of employment, to list
every organization to which he has belonged during the last five years, for such a re-
quirement would cut too broadly across his first amendment rights. Shelton v. Tucker,
364 U.S. 479 (1960).
9 Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964). This case may very well stand for the
proposition that there is no presumption of constitutionality where statutes regulate first
amendment freedoms.
10385 U.S. 589 (1967).
11Id. at 591-92. Other states have statutory requirements. See statutes cited note
1 supra.12 The district court initially refused to convene the three-judge court for lack of
a federal question. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 233 F. Supp. 752 (W.D.N.Y.
1964), rev'd, 345 F.2d 236 (2d Cir. 1965).
12385 U.S. at 594-95. See also note 6 supra and accompanying text.
14 Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966). The Court cited a series of cases lead-
ing up to Elfbrandt which were decided subsequent to Adler. 385 U.S. at 606-07.
1r 377 U.S. 360 (1964). The Court in Keyishian cited a series of cases leading up
to this decision. 385 U.S. at 603-04.
16 Id. at 604. Although it is dictum, this language may very well sound an alarm
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The exact objection to the Board of Regents' plan appears to
have centered around the problem of statutory definition.' Both
the Education Law'" and the Civil Service Law' 9 required the re-
moval of state employees for treason or sedition. The Education
Law, which governed the appellants, did not define these terms,
but the Civil Service Law incorporated the definition of criminal
anarchy in the Penal Law by reference. 20 Since the Feinberg Law
empowered the Board of Regents to prescribe machinery for the
enforcement of both the Education and the Civil Service Laws, and
since the same language was used in both, it might be contended
that the Education Law also incorporates by reference the defini-
tion of criminal anarchy contained in the Penal Law. But the stat-
utes governing criminal anarchy2' proscribed its advocacy, which
was defined to include the public display of any book advocating
the overthrow of government by force.2 This was held to be too
broad a restriction on first amendment rights.
This, then, is the crucial point. Because of the complexity and
broadness of these interrelated rulings and statutes, "no teacher can
know just where the line is to be drawn."2  Therefore, since he
cannot know exactly what conduct is prohibited, the teacher will
avoid any controversial activity, thereby losing his academic free-
dom and the protection of the first amendment.24  The Keyishian
Court did not deny to the state the right to protect its educational
system from subversion, but it did make it dear that no regulation
can sweep away legitimate exercises of first amendment rights.25
regarding the growing complexity of legislative and administrative regulations gener-
ally, for the Court appears to be equating vagueness with complexity.
17Id. at 597-98.
1 8 N.Y. EDUc. L~w § 3021.
19 N.Y. Crv. SERV. LAw § 105.
20 N.Y. PEN. LAW 5 160.
21 N.Y. PEN. LAw § 160-61. Both sections are to be consolidated into one section
entitled "criminal advocacy" effective Sept 1, 1967. 385 U.S. at 599 n.6. This fur-
ther strengthens the argument that the reference to § 160 ultimately brings § 161 into
play.
22 See note 21 supra. The Court appears to have assumed that the prohibition
against the mere display of books by Penal Law § 161 was unconstitutionally broad,
for, having reached that point in the argument, 14r. Justice Brennan's opinion appears
to move quickly into the conclusion. 385 U.S. at 598-99.
23 Id. at 599.
24 Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487-90 (1960). The Keyishian Court de-
scribed the curtailing effect as caused by "a highly efficient in terrorem mechanism."
385 U.S. at 601.
2 5 NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 444 (1962); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513,
528-29 (1958); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 368-69 (1931).
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Four Justices dissented. "No court has ever reached out so far
to destroy so much with so little," declared Mr. Justice Clark, speak-
ing for Justices White, Harlan, and Stewart."8 Adopting a tack
strikingly similar to that of the dissent by Mr. Justice Frankfurter
in Adler v. Board of Educ., Mr. Justice Clark found that the issues
presented were "abstract and entirely speculative in character,"2
since the Board of Regents had relaxed its administrative require-
ments and no longer demanded the loyalty certificate.29 In addi-
tion, he indicated that the appellants had not exhausted their ad-
ministrative remedies."0 Therefore, since no real controversy
existed, the minority concluded that the case should not have been
decided at all, but should have been rejected out of hand."1
However, if there had been enough of a "case" to warrant a
decision on the merits, the dissenting Justices would nevertheless
have upheld the statute. Four points were relied upon in support
of this view: First, regardless of the rationalization used, the mi-
nority insisted that the Court was striking down the law it had up-
held just fifteen years earlier.3 2 Second, Adler had been cited fre-
quently with approval and had in no way been eroded by subse-
quent cases.3" Third, it was asserted that the arguments briefed in
Adler specifically discussed the vagueness problem, and by uphold-
ing the law that problem must have been resolved despite the tenor
of the opinion. 4 With regard to the question of dismissal for mere
28 385 U.S. at 622.
27 342 U.S. 485, 497 (1952). See note 5 supra.
28 385 U.S. at 621. The majority opinion dealt with this question by indicating
that while the actual requirement may be withdrawn, the machinery is merely dormant,
and new methods may be devised by the Board of Regents pursuant to its statutory
authority. Therefore, it was not so much the certificate as the statute behind it which
was in question. Id. at 596.
29 But see note 28 supra.
80 385 U.S. at 621 (dissenting opinion). See note 12 supra.
31 Ibid. Article Il of the United States Constitution grants jurisdiction to federal
courts to hear "cases and controversies." This has generally been interpreted to mean
actual grievances presented by those actually aggrieved. Frothingham v. Mellon, 262
U.S. 447 (1923); Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911). The former require-
ment is refered to as "standing," and bears striking resemblance to the procedural "real
party in interest" provisions. A doctor does not have "standing" to assert the rights of
his patient. Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44 (1943).
32 385 U.S. at 622. For the distinction utilized by the majority, see note 6 supra
and accompanying text.
33 Id. at 624-25.
3 Id.at 626-27. The majority had stated that
constitutional doctrine which has emerged since that decision [Adkl has re-
jected its major premise. That premise was that public employment, includ-
ing academic employment, may be conditioned upon the surrender of consti-
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membership in a Communist organization, such membership was
considered to be merely evidentiary of subversive activity and, un-
der the new ruling, did not result in automatic dismissal." Finally,
the minority reminded the Court that arrayed against all personal
rights was the "right of self preservation." 6
These contentions are subject to at least two criticisms. First,
in response to the proposition that the dispute was either too ab-
stract or moot, 7 it must be recalled that the issue involved was a
first amendment question and, as such, might be subject to special
considerations. While it might have been appropriate to have with-
held judicial review until the state courts had passed upon the ques-
tion,"8 or to have waited until the situation became a real contro-
versy,"9 such a delay could have cost the appellants their jobs. The
mere threat of such a result" could cause a curtailment of free ex-
pression, since eventual reinstatement by court decree is both an un-
certain and unsatisfactory vindication for anyone with a family to
support. Second, to allow membership to be evidence of a specific
intent to advocate the overthrow of the government, places the bur-
den on the individual to show that his membership is passive and
therefore, as a practical matter, restricts his freedom of association.41
There are at least three salutary effects of the Keyishian deci-
sion. First, and obviously, the Court in its discussion of the need
for freedom of thought in the intellectual community dearly recog-
nized the existence of academic freedom.42 Second, the Court rec-
ognized to a limited extent the autonomy of the academic commu-
tutional rights which could not be abridged by direct government action. Id.
at 605.
851d. at 628. Adler was in accord with this line of thinking. Adler v. Board of
Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 490-91 (1952).
36 Ibid.
87 See notes 5 and 28 supra.
38 See Baggett v. Bllitt, 377 U.S. 360, 378-79 (1964).
89 See note 31 supra.
40 See note 24 supra and accompanying text. This is exactly why restrictions of
this nature may not be broader than the wrong to be remedied. They may not, for
example, sweep within their prohibitions legitimate exercises of constitutional rights
under the first amendment. See cases cited note 25 supra.
41 See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487-90 (1960). The point is persua-
sively argued by the appellants in the brief in Keyishian. Brief for Appellants, p. 73,
Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
42 385 U.S. at 603.
Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which
is of transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the teachers concerned.
That freedom is therefore a special concern of the First Amendment, which
does not tolerate laws which cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom.
Ibid.
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nity, which is the essence of its freedom.' Third, while not dosing
the door to legislative control of the academic community, it
definitively stated under what conditions and with what standards
of clarity such regulations may be imposed. This may elicit more
thoughtful enactments from state legislatures and hopefully the re-
peal of such hysteria-bred legislation as the offensive "red flag '"
and other poorly drafted anti-subversive laws.45 Many of these
statutes are relics of the McCarthy era and are in flagrant disregard
of Supreme Court rulings. The public clamor which caused the
enactment of these laws has subsided, and state legislators can now
address themselves to the task of enacting statutes which will pro-
4 3 The policy was stated by Henry Steele Commager, who observed that "ques-
dons of fitness to teach and carry" on research are always academic questions." Com-
mager, The Nature of Academic Freedom, Saturday Review, Aug. 27, 1966, p. 14.
4 4 Many states have laws prohibiting the display of red flags or emblems associated
with the Communist revolution. The California law prohibiting the display of a red
flag was invalidated by the Supreme Court in 1931 on the grounds that it might sweep
within its ambit peaceful and orderly demonstration protected by the first amendment.
Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931). Despite the clarity of the Stromberg
opinion, many states still have similar questionable statutes in force, and, more re-
grettably, the annotators have in many cases failed to recognize Stromberg at all. The
impingement upon academic freedom is obvious; teachers in states with "red flag"
lws, unaware of the existence of Stromberg or unwilling to face the dour prospect of
criminal prosecution, will be unwilling to display a red flag even for educational pur-
poses. See the argument in note 24 supra and accompanying test
At least eight states have such laws. Mic. STAT. ANN. 5 28.237 (1962); MONT.
REV. CODES ANN. § 94-4409 (1947); Omo REV. CODE 5 2921.07; OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 21, § 374 (1958); ORE. REv. STAT. § 162.740 (1955); WiS. STAT. ANN.
§ 946.04 (1958). Delaware has a provision for intent, which may make the statute
constitutional. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 863 (1953). Iowa makes the carrying of
a red flag or emblem presumptive evidence of treason or inciting the overthrow of gov-
ernment. IowA CODE ANN. § 689.6 (1949). The statute raises another constitutional
question: that of the reasonableness of the connection between the fact proved and the
fact presumed. Manley v. Georgia, 279 U.S. 1 (1929) (presumption of fraud at every
bank insolvency invalid).
45 More interesting provisions include the following, all questionable in light of
Keyishian and recent cases: MASS GEM. LAws ANN. ch. 264, § 20 (providing attorney
general with injunctive machinery against convicted subversives teaching in public or
private schools); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 5-3-12 (1953) (prohibiting any attempt, direct
or indirect, to teach or justify subversive activity); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-12-1 (1951)
(prohibits public display of books containing subversive material); R.L GE . LAWS
ANN. § 11-43-14 (1956) (providing that any meeting to discuss overthrow of the gov-
ernment is unlawful assembly and may be treated as any public riot); TEX. CIV. STAT.
ANN. art. 6252-7, § 3 (1962) (requiring authors of textbooks for public schools to cer-
tify their loyalty).
In Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956), the Supreme Court declared that
the states no longer had the right to punish advocacy of the overthrow of the United
States government, since the federal interest is supreme and the state interest is pre-
empted by comprehensive federal legislation. In addition, the Court felt that dual en-
forcement would create conflicts with the federal program. Despite the clarity of this
pronouncement, many states still declare that they will punish sedition against the
United States. E.g., MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 94-4401-02 (1947).
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tect legitimate state interests while satisfying the requirements laid
down by the Court in Keyishian and other cases.
Freedom for research and teaching46 is a worthwhile objective
in a free society. Keyishian gives substance to the independence of
the academic community by providing a dear discussion of academic
freedom,47 treating it as an adjunct of the first amendment.48 But
perhaps more importantly, the Court's willingness to hear the case
despite the apparent lack of a real controversy49 suggests that first
amendment rights, including that of academic freedom, do in fact
possess a special, perishable status which will not tolerate delay."
BRIAN J. HEISLER
46 Academic freedom should not be justified by the need for research alone, be-
cause that would lead a destruction of interdisciplinary communication. For example,
it would raise the question whether a chemistry professor should be allowed to speak on
the subject of sexual morays. Illinois refused to consider the constitutional implica-
tions of this question. Koch v. Board of Trustees, 39 Il App. 2d 51, 187 N.X.2d 340
(1962), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 989 (1964).
4 7 It should be mentioned that academic freedom was not always thought of as a
legal right. See Murphy, Academic Freedom: An Emerging Constitutional Right, 28
LAw & CONTEmp. PROB. 447, 453-57 (1963).
4 8 See note 42 supra and accompanying test. Perhaps it is a penumbral right. Cf.
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
50 See notes 5, 28, 31 supra and accompanying text.
51 See text accompanying notes 37-40 supra.
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